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Abstract 
 
For two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall globalization functioned as a 
unifying force in the West.  In the absence of a common security threat, the United 
States and Europe found common ground in a neoliberal agenda calling for the freer 
movements of capital, goods, services, and peoples across national boundaries. 
Today, support for that neoliberal agenda has been rapidly weakening across the 
West.  Drawing on a variety of quantitative measures, we show that Western support 
for globalization has declined, both at the level of national policy and at the level of 
party politics. We argue that this erosion of domestic support for globalization is 
closely linked to the rise of populist parties in Europe and the US. We consider the 
implications of this shift in the West’s domestic politics for the future of transatlantic 
cooperation and leadership.  
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Introduction 
 
Can the United States and Europe continue to work together to preserve the 
liberal world order? Will the forces of illiberalism that are afoot in America, Eurasia, 
the Middle East, and elsewhere strengthen or weaken the West’s resolve and capacity 
for collective action?  Today, there is reason to think that the political room for 
transatlantic leadership is narrowing. This is not only because the world is becoming 
more multipolar, or because Americans and Europeans hold different cultural 
priorities and values. Domestic politics in the United States and Europe are also 
making it harder for leaders in the US and Europe to find common ground. Rising 
nationalism, widening inequality, declining trust, and indeed, rising illiberalism on 
both sides of the Atlantic are weakening the domestic foundations of Western 
leadership. 
In this article we examine the shifting domestic bases of Western leadership.  
We make two arguments.  First, we argue that in the absence of a common security 
agenda after the fall of the Soviet empire, Western elites found renewed common 
ground in a neoliberal global agenda calling for the freer movements of capital, 
goods, services, and peoples across national boundaries. The political viability of this 
strategy, we argue, depended greatly on globalization’s ability to compensate for the 
disappearance of the Soviet threat by generating tangible domestic benefits for 
average citizens. Today, growing numbers of Americans and Europeans are no longer 
convinced that globalization is paying the kind of pocketbook dividends it once did. 
The current populist backlash against free trade in the US and Europe is clear 
evidence of this.  So is mounting opposition to immigration and multilateral 
cooperation.  
Second, we argue that this populist backlash has made it riskier for political 
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leaders to invest political capital in policies aimed at promoting international 
openness, economic integration, and global engagement. This is especially evident in 
the United States, where Donald Trump took aim at free trade, immigration, 
outsourcing and international commitments. Many of the same domestic forces 
pressuring America today to lighten its international load (e.g., wage stagnation, 
rising inequality, and political polarization) are manifest in Europe. Here, too, elected 
officials are soft-peddling core principles around which market democracies have 
orientated themselves internationally for the past seventy years. 
Globalization’s failure to deliver on its economic promise for Americans and 
European is one reason it has lost popular support.  We show that a related but distinct 
force is the growing strength of populist parties in the electoral marketplace. By 
politicizing globalization, populist parties on the right and left have managed to put 
mainstream political parties and their leaders on the political defensive. Efforts to 
promote increased openness and interdependence, especially in the area of 
international trade, have stalled in the face of mounting popular opposition and 
resistance. While it remains to be seen whether the populist forces will push the 
West’s commitment to internationalism to its crucial ‘tipping point,’ it seems clear 
any political leader or party to invest political capital in expanding globalization will 
have to overcome stiff domestic opposition.   
We develop these arguments in three steps.
i
  We begin our analysis by looking 
back at how globalization replaced containment of the Soviet Union as the key 
justification for closer transatlantic relations after the end of the Cold War. In 
particular, we look at how this shift was manifest at the level of national policy, and 
in America’s and Europe’s party politics. We show that globalization enjoyed broad 
domestic support in the US and Europe during the 1990s. This continued into the 
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2000s.  The second section focuses on the erosion of that domestic support over the 
course of the 2000s, manifested in both policy-regulations supporting political and 
economic globalization, and the content of party manifestos in the US and Europe. 
The third section considers how populist parties in the US and Europe have 
contributed to the erosion of support for globalization. We conclude by considering 
the implications of our analysis for the future of Western leadership.  
 
From Geopolitics to Globalization  
  For nearly a half century after World War II, transatlantic cooperation rested 
on two foundational pillars.  The first was the presence of a common threat, namely 
Soviet power.  The second was the strength and breadth of citizen benefits from 
Europe’s and America’s economic openness (free trade, foreign investment, open 
immigration).  The Soviet presence on Europe’s doorstep gave leaders in Western 
capitals reason to mobilize their publics to support efforts to contain and isolate it.  
The economic rewards their publics gained from international openness made it easier 
for these same Western leaders to promote ever greater levels of interdependence and 
integration. In short, during the Cold War America and Europe’s commitment to 
international openness reinforced their investment in shared security. 
The end of the Cold War weakened these security and economic ties.  The 
absence of a common geopolitical threat made it harder to rationalize transatlantic 
cooperation on security grounds while increasing Western leaders’ reliance on 
arguments for economic openness to sustain Western unity.  ‘Globalization’ became 
the buzzword across the West. The term found its way into everyday discourse around 
the world, and especially into discussions over national policy.  The end of the Cold 
War appeared to herald a new era in which the world would become ever smaller and 
more interconnected – a ‘global village’ – shaped by common purpose. Critics were 
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quick to point out that globalization was nothing new (Hirst, Thompson and Bromley, 
2009). Other eras in world history also witnessed dramatic changes in the level of 
global interconnectedness. The Cold War itself was an engine of globalization, 
especially in transport, technological communications and international institutions.
ii
  
The end of the Cold War marked a turning point in transatlantic politics.  The 
geopolitical rivalries that had defined so much of 20
th
 century international politics 
were over.  The only question was what form international cooperation would take in 
the new global era. Francis Fukuyama (1992) declared that the end of the ideological 
struggle meant that humanity had reached the ‘end of history’. Geopolitics would give 
way to commercialism; nationalism would be displaced by liberalism. Others, like 
Samuel Huntington (1993), envisioned an international order defined more by 
religious and cultural divisions than interstate rivalries and balance of power politics.
 
But these voices were subsumed by a broader set of ideas and policies that explained 
both why the West had won the Cold War, and why open borders and free trade 
should be adopted by other nation-states. Globalization, now as something of a 
catchall term, had long been a justification for a series of international and domestic 
policies that promised greater wealth and security for all.   
In the economic realm, globalization took the form of neoliberalism, for better 
or for worse.  Economic policies that had gained traction in the 1980s as Reaganomics 
and Thatcherism were now expanded and generalized. Thomas Friedman (1999: 83-
92) wrote about states putting on a ‘golden straightjacket’ – a series of economic 
policies that grew your economy while shrinking the political options open to elected 
leaders. Increased competition, deregulation, and privatization meant less inflation, 
lower tariffs and smaller government. In the heady days of the 1990s, the global 
expansion of neoliberalism seemed to many to be the path to greater economic 
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prosperity and social inclusion. While the fit of Friedman’s ‘golden straightjacket’ 
varied from nation to nation, it became a powerful, if grudgingly accepted or forcibly 
imposed, norm across the West and increasingly, the Rest. 
The spread of the neoliberal model around the world became a key plank of 
US and European policy. Through the IMF and the World Bank a series of policies 
known informally as ‘the Washington Consensus’ emphasized the importance of 
market forces as a solution for economies deemed to be in need of belt-tightening and 
liberalization. The US and Europe pursued policies to encourage the opening up of 
previously closed economies, including large states such as Brazil, Russia, India and 
China (Chen, 1992; Christensen, 2006). Multilateral institutions became a key point 
of coordination of these efforts. While Europe and the United States might have 
slugged it out in trade disputes through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its 
predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, they generally supported 
WTO expansion to include countries such as China (Sbragia, 2010).  
In building these institutions, the US and Europe drew on historical precedent. 
Throughout the Cold War, the number of multilateral institutions created for dealing 
with common problems proliferated. In the 1990s, Western-led institutions drew in 
new member states keen to embrace economic policies that seemed to work for 
Washington and Brussels. Even when the size and diversity of these institutions 
meant they struggled to find unity, the US and Europe sought to lead new multilateral 
ways forward. When WTO negotiations stalled, governments in the US and Europe 
sought instead to create two large multilateral trading agreements – the Trans Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). 
Both were intended by the US and Europe to protect their economic and regulatory 
models in the face of emerging economic powers, to shape globalization in their 
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interests by expanding free trade and as such, be strategic tools to manage world 
politics (Korteweg, 2015). These represented attempts by the US and Europe to 
continue to cooperate to protect economic and regulatory models that worked for the 
West. 
After the end of the Cold War, the West’s embrace of globalization also led it 
to redefine what issues counted as security issues.   Issues such as disease, the 
environment, and crime, terrorism, and civil war which had long languished at the 
margins of Western policy debates over security, now became the emergencies to 
address (Buzan, 1997).’ Cold War military and security arrangements were 
reconfigured, including bilateral agreements and those shared by the US and Europe 
in NATO. The collapse of the USSR left redundant large swathes of garrisons and 
military arrangements created to contain the USSR. Meanwhile, the move by NATO 
countries away from conscription towards smaller, professional, flexible militaries 
that could fight expeditionary warfare was considered necessary to better manage the 
risks associated with the new world order (e.g., fragile states, regional destabilization, 
refugees).
iii
  The September 11 attacks made these efforts more urgent.  Terrorist 
groups, WMD proliferation and rogue regimes were portrayed as threats not only to 
national security but also to a wider liberal globalized political and economic system.  
In short, the US and European embrace of globalization meant greater, not 
less, transatlantic cooperation in the immediate post-Cold War era. We can see this 
not only in the history of the period, but also in data measuring US and European 
governments’ support for globalization and transatlantic partnership. Figure 1 maps 
the policy positions of European countries on these two dimensions – globalization 
and transatlantic partnership – between 1970 and 2013.  
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Figure 1: Globalization and Voting with US in UN General Assembly, 
 1970-2013 
  
Sources: MPD (Volkens et.al. 2012); KOF Globalization Index (2016),  
author calculations 
 
 
The vertical axis in Figure 1 provides a general measure of transatlantic 
partnership: the degree to which individual European nations vote with the United 
States in the UN General Assembly.
iv
 This is a widely used measure of international 
political cooperation, covering voting stances on all issues voted-upon in the 
Assembly – from high politics issues involving arms and interventions to many low-
politics issues of economic, environmental, human-rights and other dimensions of 
statecraft – regardless of which country tabled and sponsored a given resolution (see 
for example Voeten, 2004; Gartzke, 1998).
 
Focusing only on the US-European vote-
alignment, it can be construed as a broad tendency of the US to vote with a given 
European country (or the EU bloc) on such issues. While certainly imperfect, it 
captures a systematic measure applicable to many countries and years for degree of 
transatlantic political embrace.  
The horizontal axis in Figure 1 measures the extent to which European 
countries adopt policy measures that support economic and political globalization. We 
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rely on KOF-index measures of economic and political globalization. Economic 
globalization refers to actual policy provisions that regulate the flow of economic 
activity across borders, including tariff rates, capital accounts restriction, among other 
data.  They do not include economic data on actual flows of trade, foreign direct 
investment.  Political globalization includes data on a country’s membership in 
international organizations, participation in UN Security Council Missions, signed 
international treaties, and number of embassies (see Dreher, 2006). 
The results paint a clear picture: the more strongly European countries adopt 
economic and political globalization, the more committed they are to transatlantic 
partnership with the United States. This pattern is in line with our contention that 
economic globalization has been an important driver of transatlantic partnership, 
particularly in the post-Cold War period. To be sure, a cross-sectional snapshot is not 
a substitute for fuller time-series analysis of globalization and transatlantic politics.  It 
does, however, offer support for the idea that countries’ commitment to globalization 
buttressed transatlantic cooperation during the Cold War and importantly, in the 
decade that followed.  
 
Retreat From Globalization 
Globalization enjoyed broad domestic support across the West in the 1990s. 
Today, it is on the political defensive. On issues ranging from immigration, to trade, 
to security, support for globalization has weakened in America as well as Europe.   
Figure 2 captures this shift.  It is based on the same KOF composite measure of 
country support for economic and political globalization used above (Figure 1). As 
Figure 2 indicates, the level of country support for globalization rose consistently 
between the 1970s and late 1990s, surging in the early post-Cold War years as 
European scores on the KOF index rose rapidly. By the KOF measure, in the late 
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1990s, Europe’s commitment to globalization even eclipsed America’s. Since the 
early 2000s, however, policy support for globalization has fallen off sharply on both 
sides of the Atlantic.  Today, it is lower than at any point since the end of the Cold 
War. 
 
Figure 2: US and European Policy Support for Globalization 
 
Source: KOF Globalization Index (2016), author calculations 
 
What explains this retreat from globalization?  Does the decline at the country 
level and in national policy mirror a waning of support at the level of domestic parties 
and public opinion?  To get a handle on these questions, we turned to the Manifesto 
Project Database (MPD) to map US and European party preferences.
v
  Treating party 
platforms as a proxy for popular sentiment, we measured the level of pro-
globalization sentiment between 1980 and 2015.
vi
 The term Net Pro-Globalization in 
Figure 3 refers to the net percentage of total party platform sentences or phrases 
expressing support for internationalism, free trade and the European Union (i.e., 
opposition) minus the percentage of sentences or phrases expressing opposition for 
these items.
vii
 To generate the country-year party-system averages for the purposes of 
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such a Figure, we use linear interpolation of a party’s position between election years, 
and then take the un-weighted average of all party positions in a given country-year. 
 
Figure 3: Pro-globalization positions in US and EU  
Party Platforms, 1980-2015 
 
Source: MPD (Volkens et.al. 2012), author calculations 
 
As Figure 3 indicates, political contentment with globalization and 
internationalism has dropped steadily over the past decade.  This is especially true in 
Europe, where average party support for pro-globalization positions in EU-15 polities, 
as expressed in party platforms, dropped sharply. European parties are now only 
slightly more supportive of globalization than opposed. The dotted line represents the 
cross over point. The closer the yearly scores are to the dotted line, the weaker party 
support for globalization is, with negative positioning constituting net anti-
globalization. Pro-globalization sentiment remains generally stronger in the United 
States by this measure, though here too, there is a noticeable sagging in support for 
anti-globalization positions among America’s Republican and Democratic parties 
since 2008.  Once the data becomes available we expect to see a continuation or 
acceleration of this trend given the anti-globalization platforms both parties supported 
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in the 2016 election.  This basic set of trends shows, however, that globalization, 
which was something of a political balm across the West only a decade ago, is now an 
object of domestic scorn and contestation.  
 
Explaining Globalization’s Decline 
What explains the erosion of support for globalization in Europe and the 
United States reported above? We know that this question has many answers that we 
cannot fully capture or referee in this article.  But certainly a large part of the answer 
is linked to the rise of populism across the West. To be sure, populism is related to 
and partly fueled by disillusionment with globalization itself. However, populism 
cannot be solely explained by globalization. Party politics, charismatic leadership, and 
other domestic factors also explain the rise of populist movements.  Meanwhile, 
populist parties have been at the forefront of efforts to mobilize publics against 
economic and political globalization.  There are thus good reasons to view the rise of 
populist parties as an independent or exogenous source of declining policy and party 
support for globalization and transatlantic cooperation.  
Evidence for populism as a source of declining support for globalization can 
be seen in Figure 4.  These summary plots are based on the MPD party-platform data 
described in Figure 3 above. By disaggregating the full sample of Western political 
parties, Figure 4 isolates those parties that are least supportive of globalization. The 
graph includes the overall mean for different party types (e.g. Green, Liberal) than 
can be found in all OECD electoral systems in the MPD dataset. The white horizontal 
lines represent the sample medians for each party type. The dark-shaded boxes 
capture the lower 25
th
 and upper 75
th
 percentile in the distribution (the ‘interquartile 
range’).  The ‘whiskers’ represent the lowest and highest adjacent values, respectively 
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(outliers beyond these values are not shown).
viii
  As Figure 4 indicates, these are 
parties on the radical Left and especially, the radical Right.  
 
Figure 4: Net pro-globalization across party types in the West 
 
Source: MPD (Volkens et.al. 2012), author calculations 
 
As noted earlier, the rise of these populist parties itself is a symptom of the 
decline  in Western support for economic and political globalization.  Indeed, populist 
parties and movements have surfaced in more and more Western countries since the 
early 2000s. This trend coincides with the erosion of party and policy support 
captured in Figures 2 and 3 above.  These snapshots from the MPD data are of course 
only suggestive and more research on the links between populism and globalization is 
needed.  Yet these trends do indicate that the recent retreat from globalization in the 
West owes much to the populist ferment it has fueled.  
The term ‘populism’ is a broad-ranging one. As Figure 4 suggests, it is not 
confined to the left or the right (also see Grabow, 2013; Mudde, 2015; Goodwin, 
2012). The right-leaning populism of the US’s Donald Trump is different in important 
ways from the leftist populism of Bernie Sanders, but political analysts often classify 
both as populist movements. Similarly, in the UK, the populism of Nigel Farage’s 
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right wing UKIP party differs from the populism of Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour party. 
Yet whether on the left or the right, such groups and parties have moved from the 
extremes of polities to the mainstream. Images of skinhead racists on the right and 
striking communists on the left have given way to slick political parties that, in cases 
such as Marine Le Pen’s Front National or Donald Trump’s presidential campaign, 
now vie for high office (Heyer, 2015).  
These groups represent a real challenge to establishment parties and 
politicians.  An emergent literature identifies some of their critiques of the old 
political elite (see for example, Mudde, 2015). First, traditional parties are seen as 
unwilling to engage with the issues populist parties have tapped into, especially 
immigration and growing inequality. Yet there is a general sense that the economic 
and political status-quo pursued since 1989 no longer works. Second, the failure of 
traditional parties to engage has led to a widespread public perception that ‘they are 
all the same.’ Third, the established parties seem powerless in the face of higher 
powers, such as the EU. In promoting their views, the populist parties have been adept 
at harnessing the very communication technologies that propelled modern 
globalization. Social media and instant communication allowed the upstarts to bypass 
traditional media and sources of information.  
The rise of populist parties has raised questions about the stability and future 
of liberal democracy in both the US and Europe. Although some of this discussion 
can be guilty of hyperbole, the rejection by such parties of the traditional norms of US 
and European politics has shifted debate away from issues on the traditional left-right 
axis towards debates that run along liberal-authoritarian lines. The rejection of 
traditional parties has led to questions about traditional institutions and the norms they 
have helped create. Some on the right, but also on the left, have shown admiration of 
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Vladimir Putin and Russia as a ‘sovereign democracy that is beholden to no other 
power.’ This reflects a skeptical view of US and European political systems as weak 
and hamstrung by international rules and institutions (Shafer, 2016). The idea that 
powers such as China or Russia are outmaneuvering and prospering at the expense of 
the US and Europe is a common complaint. There is a lack of trust between the 
general public and the elites and the governing institutions they have created, such as 
the EU (Hutt, 2016).  
The economic outcomes of globalization have fueled populism.
ix
 The 
movement of manufacturing jobs to countries in the developing world sped up in the 
late 1990s and early twenty first century, with the opening up China, Mexico and 
Eastern Europe. This accelerated deindustrialization, adding to the lists of the long-
term unemployed. Government retraining programs, social safety nets, and social 
service provision programs have been woefully underfunded (Goodman, 2016). 
Struggling communities and families were dealt a further blow by the financial crises 
and Great Recession of 2007-2009.  Growing numbers of the ‘left behind’ feel that 
they have been politically ignored or sidelined (Jones, 2012; Vance, 2016; Luce, 
2016). This is clear from polling data in the US (Pew Research Center, 2015; Pew 
Research Center, 2016). Similar trends are clear in the Eurozone (Kahn and 
Tananbaum, 2015; Durant et al. 3, 2013; Oesch, 2008).
 
 
It was once a taboo to discuss the idea of a member state withdrawing from 
the EU (Oliver, 2015: 410). Now there is open speculation on the disintegration of the 
entire Union. As Charles Kupchan (2010) argued, ‘From London to Berlin to 
Warsaw, Europe is experiencing a renationalization of political life, with countries 
clawing back the sovereignty they once willingly sacrificed in pursuit of a collective 
ideal.’ While polling suggests it might be too early to call time on the EU, the same 
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polling shows growing support for Eurosceptic positions (Stokes, 2015). And what is 
true of Europe is true of the transatlantic community more generally. 
Indeed, public opinion polls indicate that Americans and Europeans are less 
committed to working together than they were during globalization’s heyday. Figure 
5 shows that since 2000 and especially since 2008, there has been marked decline in 
public support in Europe and the United States for transatlantic cooperation over 
security and diplomatic matters.
x
  This should not really surprise us.  After all, much 
popular anger over globalization’s domestic effects is directed against the 
Washington’s and Brussels’s political class. If the absence of a geopolitical challenger 
has made transatlantic partnership less urgent domestically, the backlash against 
globalization has also made it harder for American and European leaders to secure 
domestic support for their foreign policies and programs. 
 
Figure 5: Support for transatlantic diplomatic partnership, 
2004-2014* 
 
 
 
* Percentage who think that partnership in security and diplomatic  
affairs between the US and Europe should become closer or remain  
about the same. 
 
Source: German Marshall Fund-US, Transatlantic Trends 2014,  
author calculations 
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Conclusion 
For the past quarter of a century, the transatlantic partnership has rested on 
Western public support for globalization.   In the absence of a shared security threat, 
US and European leaders and their publics relied instead on their common cause in a 
neoliberal agenda that stressed the material advantages of international openness, 
economic integration, and global engagement.  As we have argued here, it is now 
clear that commitment to that agenda on the part of policymakers and citizens in 
Western countries has eroded substantially. Mainstream parties that formed the 
backbone of the transatlantic consensus are fending off challenges from the anti-
globalization-mongering of both left and right populisms – a breadth and depth of 
such mongering that few would have imagined even a decade ago.  Consistent with 
our broader argument of the positive links between neoliberal globalization and 
transatlantic cooperation, we have also seen that this eroding policy and party-
political support for globalization is beginning to spill over into erosion in public 
support for transatlantic partnership. 
To be sure, the Western international order is not dead.  America and Europe 
remain each other’s most reliable partners.  Still, it seems clear that the neoliberal 
agenda that has sustained the relationship since the end of the Cold War is being 
challenged in ways that democratically-elected leaders cannot ignore.  As we have 
shown, party-political and policy support for free trade, open immigration, and 
economic integration continue to weaken.  And underlying this pattern, as we have 
hypothesized above, populist sentiment has won and continues to win ground in many 
parts of Europe and America. The UK’s decision to ‘Brexit’ the European Union and 
the election of Donald Trump make clear that a tipping point may well be near. The 
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question is when those thresholds are most likely to be crossed, and at what cost to 
transatlantic relations.  
In thinking about the future of the West, efforts like the current EU Global 
Strategy initiative need to focus more attention on how domestic politics shape the 
possibilities for transatlantic cooperation (see Trubowitz and Burgoon, 2016). 
Whether the partnership is strengthened or weakened in the years ahead depends 
greatly on whether elites in Europe and the United States are willing and able to take 
bold action to tame the bitterness, resentments, and mistrust roiling their domestic 
politics.   This is a tall order, given the Eurozone’s economic malaise and stagnation 
and the polarized state of American politics.  Yet incremental half-measures will do 
little to quell the populist furore that is bubbling up from below.  If Western leaders 
hope to revitalize transatlantic relations, they will have to address the causes of anger 
and resentment in their own backyards. Transatlantic cooperation begins at home. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
i
 In the limited space of this article, these arguments can only be modestly and incompletely developed, 
and the supporting empirical evidence only illustratively specified. However, together the arguments 
and illustrations provide a basis for reinterpreting how and why transatlantic cooperation has weakened 
in recent years. 
ii
 Some have argued that the growth and integration of the world economy during the Cold War helps 
explain the collapse of the Soviet empire (Books and Wohlforth, 2000).  
iii
 A good example was the British Government’s Strategic Defence Review (1998).  
iv
 Data in Figure 1 are from Strezhnev and Voeten (2013). 
v
 The Manifesto database for the period 1970-2015 includes 455 parties.  It includes all OECD polities, 
including all major US and EU-15 parties (242 in all). MPD codes party platforms by policy issue for 
individual political parties by election-year. We draw on the coded variables that entail a pro- and an 
anti-position taken on issues relevant to globalisation.  This allows us to measure the broad salience of 
globalisation in a party’s platform and also the level of support for and against globalisation in the 
party’s platform. For more details on MPD, see Vokens et al. (2012). 
vi
 The EU-15 refers to the following countries:  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, (West) 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. 
vii
 These three components (support for internationalism, free trade and European Union) are the only 
items in MPD that explicitly focus on positive and negative positioning on issues of extra-national 
engagement. For more details, see Burgoon (2009) and Burgoon (2013).  
viii
 The ‘adjacent values’ are those outlier observations that fall outside the upper and lower quartiles 
defining the ‘interquartile range’ (IQR).  This is, formally, observations that fall at or beyond the lower 
and upper whiskers, where: Lower whisker=Q1 - 1.5 IQR; and Upper whisker=Q4 + 1.5 IQR. 
ix
 As The Economist (2016) put it, ‘Globalization is increasingly blamed for job losses, rising wage 
inequality and sluggish GDP growth.’ 
x
 The figure is based on survey data from the German Marshall Fund and Chicago Council on Foreign 
Relations. Publics in the US and a cross-section of major European countries were asked: “Do you 
think that partnership in security and diplomatic affairs between the EU and the US should…become 
closer, remain about the same, or take a more independent approach.”   
